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NOTES AND COMMENTS

waived his right to do so, should make some offer of the evidence that
he would like to prove under the stricken pleadings. Where the motion
is denied, the moving party's only remedy is to object to the evidence
when presented. If it is denied on the merits, the Superior Court
judge has made his decision to allow the evidence to come in. In this
situation the moving party should except to the denial and then object
to the evidence. If he does not except to the denial he may be considered to have waived his right to object to the evidence by acquiescing
in it; while if he fails to object to the evidence, he may, on appeal, be
considered to have waived his right to his exception to the denial. If
the judge denies the motion by invoking the "chart" rule, he is simply
deferring a decision on the question until the evidence is offered. Thus
it seems that the moving party would not have to except in order to
object to the evidence. However, in many instances the judge may give
no reason for his denial, and exception should be taken in all such cases
to prevent any subsequent contention that the judge's ruling was on
the merits.
In the interest of simplicity, and in order to clarify the difficult,
and in many cases unnecessary problems that develop from the use of
the motion to strike, it seems that it would be advantageous from both
the point of view of the court and of the parties litigant, for the court
to lay down the following set rule on motions to strike made in apt
time: (1) Where allowed, the aggrieved party may (a) except and
appeal immediately, and obtain a decision as to whether or not he may
support the contested allegations by evidence at the trial, or (b) except
to the ruling and be allowed to raise the question if the case is subsequently appealed, provided, at least, that he has preserved his exception
by offering the evidence at the trial. (2) Where denied, he may not
appeal, but must seek his relief by excepting to the ruling and objecting
to the evidence when and if it is offered.
J. B. CHESHIRE, IV.
Contracts-Effect of Second Contract With Defaulter Upon
Rights for Breach of First.
An elementary rule of contract law is that a party injured by a
breach of contract has a "duty"' to mitigate any damages suffered
'Strictly speaking the "duty" to mitigate damages is not a duty at all, not
an affirmative obligation. The rule merely sets up a standard for ascertainment of damages, recognizing a disability in the injured party to collect avoidable
damages. RaSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §336, comment (d); 5 WILILISTON,
CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3795, 3813. In the interests of.brevity the word
"duty" is used throughout this note as qualified by this footnote.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

thereby.2 Yet, in a recent case8 where the injured party entered into a
second contract with the defaulting party, in order to dispose of products left on his hands by the breach, the court held that the second
contract "superseded and rescinded" the first, and thereby barred any
recovery of damages for breach of that contract. The majority reasoned
that since the two contracts were inconsistent with each other and performance of both was impossible, the first was abrogated by the second,
despite lack of an express provision to that effect. Thus, the court,
while recognizing the doctrine of mitigation of damages, interpreted
the making of the second contract as indicating no such intent, but
rather the intent to terminate all rights under the first contract. In a
vigorous dissent, one judge 4 contended that by virtue of the "duty" on
the injured party to mitigate damages resulting from the breach of the
first contract, he should be allowed to enter into the second contract with
the party in default without barring his rights to recover damages for
the former breach.
Cases involving employment contracts have often given rise to the
question of the effect of a subsequent contract on the rights of the parties to a breached contract. These cases arise where the employee has
been wrongfully discharged by his employer, who subsequently makes
an offer of re-employment. In view of the recognized "duty" to mitigate damages, it is usually held that if the best offer, within the limits
set up by the mitigation rule, comes from the defaulting employer, then
the employee must either accept or else forfeit a pro tanto amount of
the damages suffered. 5 Thus, these cases impliedly hold that the second
contract will not rescind the first.
'McCoamicx,
DAMAGES (1935) 127, 132; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3795, 3875.
'United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 10th,

§336 (1); 5

1940).
"Huxman, Circuit Judge; id. at 465. In the principal case another judge

dissented on the ground that damages should not be recoverable for breach of the

first contract because that contract was not one that could be enforced in court.

It seemed that there was no competition when the first contract was made, and
this judge was-of the idea that the seller had taken advantage of this fact to
charge the buyer, the United States, an exorbitant price for the goods. When
the second contract was made between the parties there was competition, and the

seller's bid for the second contract was approximately 30% less than his bid
for the first contract had been.

'Morris Shoe Co. v. Coleman, 187 Ky. 837, 221 S. W. 242 (1920); Flikema
v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N. W. 362, 72 A. L. R. 1046 and note
(1930). However, this duty to re-accept employment is a qualified one, extending only to employment offered in good faith; Gray v. Pacific Suction Cleaner
Co., 171 Cal. 234, 155 Pac. 469 (1915); Schisler v. Perfection Milker Co., 193
Minn. 160, 258 N. W. 17 (1934); within the same general line of business;
Russellville Special School Dist. v. Tinsley, 156 Ark. 283, 245 S. W. 831 (1922) ;
Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass. 100, 104 N. E. 471 (1914); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3811; and not to an offer of re-employment more menial
than that for which he originally contracted; Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co.,
111 Minn. 177, 126 N. W. 541 (1910); Connell v. Averill, 8 App. Div. 524, 40
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In one leading case,6 the seller refused to deliver goods to the buyer
on credit according to the contract, but. instead offered to deliver the
same goods at a reduced cash price. The court held that the buyer
should have mitigated his damages by accepting the new offer if he had
the cash and was unable to obtain similar goods elsewhere, but ruled
that the new contract did not terminate rights for 'damages under the
original contract. This decision was based upon dicta in Warren v.
Stoddart7 to the effect that when a buyer refused to accept a seller's
new cash offer, after breach of the original contract to ship goods on
30 days credit, then the buyer could recover only nominal damages for
the breach of that contract. Many courts treat a second contract with
the 'lefaulting party as a proper method of mitigating damages,8 refusing to allow recovery of damages that could have been, but were not,
N. Y. Supp. 855 (4th Dep't 1896); nor to work that would be degrading;

Buffalo Bayou Co. v. Lorentz, 177 S. W. 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Williams
v. School Dist., 104 Wash. 659, 177 Pac. 635 (1919); 3 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
(4th Ed. 1916) 2564; offensive; Price v. Davis, 187 Mo. App. 113, 173 S. W.
64 (1915); 5 WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3798; or unreasonable;
Hirsch v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 169 Fed. 578 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); 5
WII.UsToN, CONTRACTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3798; nor does it apply if he already
has another position; see Birdsong v. Ellis, 62 Miss. 418 (1884). Where the
new offer varies the terms of the original contract so that its acceptance would
force an abandonment of rights under the first agreement, there is no duty
on the discharged employee to accept; Morris Shoe Co. v: Coleman, 187 Ky.
837, 221 S. W. 242 (1920); Holloway v. Levine, 107 Vt. 396, 180 Atl. 889
(1935); 5 Wn.LisToN, CONTRAcTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3814; unless it expressly
stipulates that entrance into the new contract will not prejudice the employee's
rights under the first contract; Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111
N. E. 832 (1916). If, after a reasonable time the employee cannot locate equivalent employment, then he should accept work for which he is best suited;
Kramer v. Wolf Cigar Stores Co., 99 Tex. 597, 91 S. W. 775 (1906); retaining
of course his right to recover damages for the breach of the former contract.
'Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894).
7105 U. S. 224, 230, 26 L. Ed. 1117, 1120 (1882).
In Lawrence v. Porter,
id. at 67, Lurton, Circuit Judge, said of this case: "The opinion in Warren v.
Stoddart rests upon the theory that the buyer does not surrender or yield any
right of action he may have for the breach of contract. It rests wholly upon
the duty of mitigating the loss by replacing the goods by others, if they are
obtainable by reasonable exertion. If this duty be such as to require him to buy
from the delinquent seller; if the article can be obtained only from him, or
because he offers it cheaper than it can be obtained from others, such a purchase
from the seller is not an abandonment of the original contract by the substitution of another, nor would the purchase operate to the seller's advantage save
in so far as the damage resulting from his bad faith was thereby reduced. If
the seller offers to sell for cash at a reduced price, or to sell for a less price
than the market price, though in excess of the contract price, with the condition
that it should operate as a waiver of the original contract, or of any right of
action for its breach, then the buyer would not be obligated to treat with the
seller, nor would the seller's offer, if rejected, operate as a reduction of damages."
8 Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178, 236 Pac. 598 (1925); Plesofsky
v. Kaufman & Flonacker, 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S. W. 204 (1918); Holloway v.
Levine, 107 Vt. 396, 180 At. 889 (1935); Stone v. United Fuel Gas Co., 111
W. Va. 569, 163 S. E. 48 (1932); 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916)
324; 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3876; See collection of cases
in Notes (1902) 54 L. R. A. 718, (1919) 1 A. L. R. 436, (1927) 46 A. L. R.
1192, (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1049.
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thus avoided, 9 and some of these expressly reject the idea that the
second contract is a rescission of the first, barring rights thereunder.10
The defaulter cannot escape liability under this rule by stipulating that
the acceptance of the new contract will be an abandonment of the
original right of action,"1 for the injured party need not accept such an
Conversely, some courts hold that entrance into a second contract,
inconsistent with an earlier one between the same parties, operates to
rescind the prior contract, and to extinguish the right to sue for the
breach of that contract.' 2 The reasoning applied is that the injured
party had an election either to enforce the original contract or relinquish his rights thereunder, and that by entering into the second contract he chose the latter course. 13 However, several of these decisions
may be distinguished from the principal case on the ground that there
had been no breach before the second contract was made.' 4 Frequently,
as in the principal case, courts will merely recite that contracts incon9Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) ; Schisler v. Perfection
Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N. W. 17 (1934); Hickey v. Perkins Dry Goods

Co., 229 S. W. 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). It is often held that "all reasonable
steps" should be taken by the injured party to mitigate his damages; Gilson v.
Royster Guano Co., 1 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924) ; Payzu, Ltd. v. Saunders,
(1919) 2 K. B. 581, (1919) 18 MicHr. L. REv. 702; but it is ordinarily said that
it is not reasonable to require the injured party to borrow money in order to
accept the defaulting seller's offer to sell for cash when credit was contracted
for; Weber Implement Co. v. Acme Harvesting Mach. Co., 268 Mo. 363, 187
S. W. 874 (1916); Stanley Manly Boy's Clothes, Inc. v. Hickey, 113 Tex. 482,
259 S. W. 160 (1924). In instances where it is impossible to get the same
goods elsewhere; Lawrence v. Porter, 63 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); as in
public utilities; Henrici v. South Feather L. & W. Co., 177 Cal. 442, 170 Pac.
1135 (1918) ; Note, (1927) 46 A. L. R. 1192, 1195; or if a refusal to enter into
the second contract would greatly aggravate damages; Ingraham v. Pullman Co.,
190 Mass. 33, 76 N. E. 237 (1906); the courts are fairly consistent in holding
that there is a "duty" to enter into the second agreement with the party in
default, thus impliedly holding that the second contract would not of itself
rescind the former agreement and bar rights thereunder.
10 Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916); Siegle
v. Hamilton-Carhartt Cotton Mills, 89 Okla. 68, 213 Pac. 305 (1923); Allen v.
Maronne, 93 Tenn. 161, 23 S. W. 113 (1893); 2 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th
Ed. 1916) 2298.
11 Farmer's Co-operative Ass'n v. Shaw, 171 Okla. 358, 42 P. (2d) 887 (1935),
(1936) 20 MINN. L. Rav. 300; Holloway v. Levine, 107. Vt. 396, 180 Atl. 889
(1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3797, 3876.
offer.
" Wiley v. Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; McCabe Const.
Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); Arizona-Parral Mining
Co. v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915) ; Riverside Coal Co. v. American
Coal Co, 107 Conn. 40, 139 Atl. 276 (1927); McKay v. Fleming, 24 Colo. App.
380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913); Agel & Levine v. Patch Mfg. Co., 77 Vt. 13, 58
AtI. 792 (1904) ; Snowball v. Maney Bros., 39 Wyo. 84, 270 Pac. 167 (1928).
" Wood v. Brighton Mills, 297 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924) ; McCabe Const.
Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); McKay v. Fleming, 24
Colo. App. 380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913) ; Johnson v. Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S. W.
531 (1922).
14 Housekeeper Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Wiley
v. Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Arizona-Parral Mining
Co. v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915).
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sistent with each other cannot stand together since performance of one
renders performance of the other impossible, 15 ignoring the possibility
that a right of action remains and the entering of the second contract
was in mitigation of damages. 16
It is true that performance of the second contract renders performance of the original contract impossible, but the injured party
agrees to the second contract only after the other party has, by repudiation, made it plain that the original contract will not be performed.
When there is no breach of the first agreement, it is but reasonable to
assume that the second agreement, inconsistent with the first, was intended to replace it and indicate a rescission of the first contract. In
such a case the making of the new agreement caused the first one not
to be performed, so that the non-perfoirnance can be called consensual.
But where the new- agreement was made only after such a repudiation
by one party as to indicate that the original agreement was not to be
carried out, then the new agreement should not indicate any intent to
rescind its predecessor. Rather, the repudiation is the reasonable explanation of the non-performance of the original contract, and the new
agreement made after the repudiation appears to be not a consent to
the non-performance, but a device adopted by the parties to meet a
situation where non-performance of the earlier agreement was already
assured. It is true, as said by the court in the principal case, that the
injured party entered into the new agreement because he felt that it
was the best course for him to follow under the circumstances, but this
statement is equally true of all mitigation arrangements. Performance
of both contracts in such a situation, while impossible, is no more impossible than performance of both where the injured party has contracted with a third party rather than the -defaulter, yet the courts
never speak of impossibility in the latter case. A contract with a third
party is the usual method of mitigating damages,' 7 and no court contends that such a contract ipso facto bars the injured party's rights to
recover for breach of the prior contract.
" Housekeeper" Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) ; McCabe
Const. Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912); McKay v. Fleming, 24 Colo. App. 380, 134 Pac. 159 (1913); 2 BLACK, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION (1916) 1249.
"eSome few courts consider and expressly reject the mitigation of damages
doctrine, especially in employment contracts where it is usually held that to
accept re-employment at less wages than those contracted for would be an
abandonment of the original right of action, regardless of the "duty" to mitigate
damages. McCabe Const. Co. v. Utah Const. Co., 199 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1912) ;
People's Co-operative Ass'n v. Lloyd, 77 Ala. 387 (1884) ; Trawick v. Peoria
& Ft. C. Ry., 68 II1. App. 156 (1896); Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 176 Miss.

65, 166 So. 395 (1936); 3

SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES

(4th Ed. 1916) 2557.

" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §336, comment (a); 1 SUTHERLAND,
DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916) 324; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) §§1353,
1385.
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Although the Restatement of Contracts' 8 provides that "A contract
containing a term inconsistent with a term of an earlier contract between the same parties is interpreted as including an agreement to
rescind the inconsistent terms of the earlier agreement.. .", this has no
express application after a breach of the first contract. Where there
has been no breach of the first contract, the generally recognized doctrine of novation, or substitution of contracts, will apply.' 9 Seemingly
it is this rule to which the Restatement refers.
It appears unreasonably paradoxical to hold that a party injured by
a breach of contract is precluded from recovering damages by virtue
of entrance into a second contract with the defaulter, when under a
court-made rule he has a "duty" to mitigate his damages, and his best
opportunity lies in the form of a new offer from the party in default.
Surely no court could hold that after a seller breached a contract for
the sale of goods for $1,000, yet offers to sell the same goods to the
buyer for $1,100, the buyer could buy from a third party for $1,250
and then recover $250 from the seller for the breach! Thus, some
courts would reach the strange conclusion that if the buyer did not
enter into the second contract with the defaulter he could recover only
a part of his damages, while if he did enter into the second contract
he could not recover any of his damages.20 'If the second contract is allowed without a waiver of the right to sue for damages, the original
contract between the parties would in effect be enforced, as the buyer
could recover any differential. Since the courts impose a "duty" to
mitigate damages after a breach of" contract, it seems highly desirable
to allow the achievement of this by entrance into a second contract with
the 'defaulter, especially where this appears to be the most effective
method of minimization, yet to preserve the right to recover any damages ensuing from the breach of the first contract unless there is an
express waiver of such right. Such a decision as the instant one leaves
a court enmeshed in contradictory cross-purposes.
Due to the conflict of decisions, it seems that the best available
assurance that the second contract may be entered into safely, is to
provide expressly therein that such contract is not to be construed as
18
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §408.
" Housekeeper Pub. Co. v. Swift, 97 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) ; Wiley v.
Dixie Oil Co., 43 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Arizona-Parral Mining Co.
v. Forbes, 16 Ariz. 395, 146 Pac. 504 (1915); 1 BLACK, RESCISSION AND CArCELLATION (1916) 11.
"0Compare Deere v. Lewis, 51 Ill. 254 (1869), with Trawick v. Peoria & Ft.
C. Ry., 68 Ill. App. 156 (1896); Birdsong v. Ellis, 62 Miss. 418 (1884), with

Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395 (1936); Plesofsky v.
Kaufman & Flonacker, 140 Tenn. 208, 204 S. W. 204 (1918), with Johnson v,
Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S. W. 531 (1922).
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a waiver or abandonment of any rights which have accrued under the
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
breached contract .2 1
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Municipal Prohibition
of House to House Peddling.
A Georgia city, having statutory authority to "license, regulate and
control ... peddlers of all kinds," 1 declared by ordinance that every
solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant and transient vendor of
merchandise, who went uninvited to a private home for the purpose of
conducting business, was a (public) nuisante. 2 Held, such an unqualified provision is an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with legal
rights, in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.3
A preliminary question to be decided in every such case is: Has the
legislature given the municipality power to pass such a law? This is
of particular significance in that courts seem to find an affirmative
grant of power a persuasive argument for constitutional validity. For,
ordinances identical to the one under consideration have been upheld
in all cases when passed by cities granted the specific power to "prohibit" hawkers and peddlers. 4 Likewise, this ordinance has been upheld in the only case arising where passed by another city under the
delegated power to "regulate" similar activities. 5 Whenever a city
had neither the power to regulate nor suppress this business, such an
21In Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N. Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832 (1916),
Cardozo, J., said of such an express provision in the second contract: "The contract itself . .. says in so many words that the old contract is not to be deemed
revived, and that no rights that have accrued under it are waived. The cause of
action against the defendant was thus plainly preserved." Even such an express
reservation might leave some room for argument if the language of Mr. Justice

White in International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303, 15 Sup.
39 L. Ed. 160 (1894), is to be taken literally. In that case it was said, at
"A party cannot avoid the legal consequences of his acts by protesting
time he does them that he does not intend to subject himself to such
quences."
'LAws
OF GEORGIA 1901, Part III, Title I, Sect. 37.
2

Ct. 97,
p. 310,
at the
conse-

This ordinance is identical with that originated by Green River, Wyoming,
and upheld in Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th,

1933).

3 De Berry v. La Grange, 8 S.E. (2d) 146 (Ga. App. 1940).
'Green River v4 Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933)
rev'g 60 F. (2d) 613 (D. C. Wyo. 1932); 1cCormick v. Montrose, 99 P. (2d)
969 (Colo. 1940) (court used this reasoning) ; cf. Goodrich v. Busse, 247 Ill. 366,
93 N. E. 292 (1910) (similar ordinance upheld for this reason).
I Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938). Accord: Ex
Parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 80 Pac. 547, 548 (1905). But cf. Cosgrove v. City
Council, 103 Ga. 835, 31 S.E. 445 (1898) ; Good Humor v. Board of Comm'rs., 124
N. J.L. 162, 11 A. (2d) 113 (1940) ; Virgo v. Toronto, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447
(1893) (passing on similar ordinances).

